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1 Introduction
Periodic waves of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been an integral part of capitalist development
since its inception, representing an important mechanism for the reorganization and restructuring of
a market economy across industries. Economic theory suggests that mergers can occur either in
response to economic shocks that trigger restructuring and consolidation, or be driven by managerial
market timing. Nonetheless, to date, there is no clear consensus as to why merger deals have occurred
in cyclical patterns in which periods of intense activity have been followed by intervening periods of
fewer mergers.
In this paper, we define a merger wave as a substantial, yet temporary, increase in the intensity of
M&A activity, and develop econometric tools to investigate whether the dominant view that merger
waves have different dynamics across industries is backed up by empirical evidence (see, for example,
Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Then, we also ask whether wave-like patterns of merger activity at
the industry level may derive from heterogeneous exposure to competing theory-based explanatory
variables, such as sector-specific economic shocks, managers’ market timing, or aggregate macro-
financial conditions.
In methodological terms, we propose a novel Markov regime-switching Poisson regression approach
with time-varying transition probabilities that allows for the explicit investigation of the driving
factors behind abnormal M&A activity. The main underlying assumption of the model is that the
decision to embark in M&A depends on a set of parameters that represent the reaction of agents to
realizations of a latent industry-specific discrete state St, which identifies mounting evidence of deals.
The intuition is simple: from the point of view of the corporate decision maker, waves in M&A at
time t are not determined by her own decision. However, observing abnormally high merger activity
increases the aggregate propensity to engage in a deal. As a result, the question of understanding
the driving factors in the dynamics of St coincides with investigating why managers value mergers
more in some states than others. This modeling framework is fairly general and implies that the
intensity of merger activity can differ across industries, that it is multi-factorial in nature, and that
it is unlikely to be entirely captured by any single, observable, industry-specific characteristic or
aggregate factor. We model merger waves as a first-order Markov state with time-varying transition
probabilities that accommodates the time-varying effect of multiple industry-specific and aggregate
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macro-financial factors. The cross-sectional heterogeneity and correlations across different industries
are captured by industry-specific random-effects that are sampled from a common distribution.
A few measurement tools for merger waves have been proposed in the literature (see, for example,
Shugart and Tollison, 1984, Town, 1992, Golbe and White, 1993, Barkoulas et al., 2001, Resende,
2008, and Choi and Jeon, 2011). The common feature of these approaches is that determinants of
merger waves are investigated in a conditionally Gaussian framework and separately after a latent
state St is identified. As a result, any causality statement is thus to be read as contingent on having
full confidence on the normal assumption for the distribution of M&A activity and the consequential
identification of waves. Unless additional assumptions are introduced, such procedures can potentially
suffer from endogeneity and misspecification issues that can distort standard hypothesis testing. We
extend the existing literature by proposing a model that explicitly and jointly acknowledges the
time-varying, uncertain, and non-Gaussian nature of M&A activity.
As far as the model estimation is concerned, we follow Chib and Winkelmann (2001), Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter and Wagner (2006), Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Fru¨hwirth (2007) and Kaufmann (2015) and
implement an approximate, yet accurate, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation scheme for
the unknown parameters, the hidden discrete states identifying merger waves, and the time-varying
transition probabilities. By using an MCMC approach, we are able to make inferences on parameters
and latent states in a single step, developing a finite-sample testing framework that is based on
the posterior distributions of virtually any function of the model outputs. This allows us to test
hypotheses on the nature, dynamics, and structure of industry merger waves in a unified setting,
which is something that earlier literature did not do.
Empirically, we focus on a sample of M&A bids announced by US private and public acquirers
for US public and private targets in the period from 1983 to 2016. M&A deals are aggregated at the
industry level for each quarter, assigning each deal to one of 12 industries based on the four-digit SIC
code of the bidder at the time of the announcement. We test a set of common competing explanatory
variables of merger waves; first, we consider industry-specific stock valuation variables related to the
behavioural hypothesis, which suggests that M&A activity is driven by firm-specific and market-wide
valuations, or managerial market timing (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan, 2004, Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005 and Maksimovic et al., 2013). A second set of
explanatory variables is related to the neoclassical hypothesis, which suggests M&A activity primarily
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occurs in response to technological, regulatory and/or economic shocks that trigger restructuring and
consolidation at the industry level (see, for example, Coase, 1937, Gort, 1969, Shleifer and Vishny,
1992, Harford, 1999, Andrade et al., 2001, Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, Maksimovic and Phillips,
2001, Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, and Harford, 2005). In addition to these mainstream theories,
we also investigate the explanatory power of aggregate macro-financial conditions (see, for example,
Melicher et al., 1983, Shugart and Tollison, 1984, Becketti, 1986, Town, 1992, Golbe and White, 1993,
Mulherin and Boone, 2000, and Choi and Jeon, 2011). Although with mixed results, these theories
have been found to explain M&A activity over the last century, and thus are clearly relevant to a
comprehensive understanding of merger waves.
We report two main novel results. First, we show that the dynamics and persistence of merger
waves change substantially across industries over the last thirty years. This suggests that wave-like
patterns are essentially industry specific. As a matter of fact, we show that the posterior estimates
of the cross-sectional correlations of industry-specific random-effects are rather low, albeit significant.
Second, we show that such heterogeneity can be explained by differences in the transition dynamics
that drive the states of merger waves. For instance, the uncertainty around valuations represents a
significant explanatory variable that negatively affects M&A activity for industries such as Manu-
facturing, Telecommunications, and Healthcare, while it does not appear to be relevant for, say, the
Money industry. Similarly, an index of economic activity, as constructed in Harford (2005), turns out
to significantly and negatively affect M&A only in the financial sector, while it barely appears in other
industries. Interestingly, merging activity in the Money industry is tightly linked with capital liquid-
ity, consistent with the idea that, in the financial industry, M&A deals are mostly pro-cyclical and
tend to occur for restructuring purposes. As a whole, the results show that deteriorating aggregate
economic conditions and the uncertainty related to market valuations are expected to be associated
with the intensity of M&A deals.
2 Modeling Merger Waves
The number of deals yit for each industry i = 1, . . . , n and time t = 1, . . . , T is modeled as a Poisson
process in which the intensity rate is a direct function of a set of industry-specific variables wit,
macroeconomic information xt, and a parameter µi that represents the unobserved cross-sectional
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heterogeneity, i.e, a group-specific random effect,
yit|λit ∼ Poisson (λit) , λit = exp
(
z′itβ
i
Sit + µi
)
, (1)
where z′it = (x
′
t,w
′
it) is a p-dimensional vector of explanatory variables, β
i,′
k =
(
βi1k, . . . ,β
i
pk
)
is the
vector of the corresponding regression parameters for St = k, µi ∼ N (µ, D) is a random effect that
is sampled from a common multivariate Normal distribution, and Sit is a latent discrete state that
identifies a merger wave for the ith industry. That is, the intensity of M&A activity is state-dependent.
We assume the latent state follows an independent first-order Markov process with time-varying
transition probabilities specified through a multi-Logit function, i.e.,
p (Sit = k|Sit−1 = l, zit−1,αi) = piilk,t =
exp
(
z′it−1α
z
ilk + αilk
)∑K
j=1 exp
(
z′it−1α
z
ilj + αilj
) , (2)
with α′i =
(
αz,′i,Sit−1,Sit ,α
′
i,Sit−1,Sit
)
that is a K(p+ 1)−dimensional vector of parameters. The hidden
nature of Sit prevents prevents the deteriministic mapping of the explanatory variables zit−1 into the
joint decision-making process of bidders and eventually into abnormally high states of merger activity.
The formulation in (2) allows us to decompose the dynamics of merger waves into two compo-
nents: a time-varying component z′it−1α
z
i,Sit−1,Sit that captures the pure effect of the determinants
on the regime-switching probabilities, and a time-invariant component αi,Sit−1,Sit that captures the
persistence of the latent state independently from exogenous factors. The reference state is defined
as the state in which the number of deals cannot be classified as falling within a merger wave. The
remaining states represent the increasing strength of merger activity.
For identification purposes, the parameters governing the transition to the state of no merger wave
are restricted to be equal to zero, i.e.
(
αz,′i,Sit−1,1,α
′
Si,it−1,1
)
= (0′, 0′). For example, for a model with
two states, this yields:
p (Sit = 1|Sit−1 = l, zit−1,αi) = pil1,t = 1
1 + exp
(
z′it−1α
z
il2 + αil2
) , l = 1, 2 (3)
such that the vector of parameters (αzil2, αil2) is the only set of parameters we need to estimate.
The specification in (2) is rather general as it involves standard implementations as special cases.
For instance, by restricting the effect of the covariate zit−1 to be independent of past states, i.e.
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αzilk = α
z
ik, we assume that the persistence of the latent state is governed only by the time-invariant
component αilk (see, for example, Filardo, 1994, and Amisano and Fagan, 2013). Further, a standard
time-homogeneous Markov regime-switching model can be recovered as a special case by restricting
αzilk = 0,∀l, k. If, instead, we restrict both αzilk = αzik and αilk = αik, we obtain the multi-state
analogue of the smooth transition model of Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) where regime probabilities
are a direct, monotone function of zit−1, and the transition mechanism is independent of the lagged
prevailing state.
One comment is in order. Our model captures over-dispersion in the dynamics of deal flow in
an unconditional sense, but not conditionally on the latent state of a merger wave. In this respect,
the Poisson regression in (1) implies that the unconditional variance of deal flow is higher than the
unconditional mean.
However, conditional on the latent state Sit, we have that V ar [yit|Sit] = E [yit|Sit] = λSit . A
possible solution would be to estimate a mixture of negative binomial distributions, which has one
parameter more than the Poisson regression and adjusts the variance independently from the mean.
We believe that would be an interesting extension to our modeling framework and represent a promis-
ing avenue for future research.
2.1 Prior Specification
We follow Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2006), Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Fru¨hwirth (2007) and
Kaufmann (2015) and implement an approximate, yet accurate, MCMC estimation scheme for the
unknown parameters, the latent state, and the time-varying transition probabilities. For each in-
dustry, the slope parameters of the p determinants of the intensity rate are gathered into the vec-
tor βi,′ =
(
βi,′1 , . . . ,β
i,′
K
)
. The parameters governing the transition probabilities are denoted by
αi = {αik|k ∈ K−k0} with k0 being the reference state, and αik = (αzi1k, . . . ,αziKk, αi1k, . . . , αiKk).
For the Bayesian inference to work, we need to specify the prior distributions for the model
parameters. For a given state Sit = k, the prior structure is conjugate as the function for the (log
of) intensity rate reduces to standard multiple linear regressions. For each state, we assume a normal
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conjugate prior:
p
(
βi
)
=
K∏
k=1
p
(
βik
)
=
K∏
k=1
Np (bik, Bik) , for i = 1, . . . , n (4)
with bik and Bik as the location and scale hyper-parameters for the ith industry, respectively. The
prior for the βs is independent of any assumption about the transition probabilities of the states.
We assume we do not have prior information about the betas and use uninformative prior hyper-
parameters, i.e. bik = 0 and Bik = I · 1000, with I a p× p identity matrix. The prior specification (4)
assumes the slope parameters for the intensity rates to be independent across industries and states.
This makes the prior invariant to state permutations.
As far as the transition probabilities are concerned, the multi-Logit specification allows us to
specify a Gaussian prior distribution for the parameter vector αik:
p (αi) =
∏
k∈K−k0
p (αik) =
∏
k∈K−k0
N (aik, Aik) , for i = 1, . . . , n (5)
in which, again, the independence across states makes the prior invariant to state permutations. The
independence across industries and regimes allows us to specify prior hyper-parameters independently
such that one prior can be imposed to be more informative for a state of, say, a merger wave. Through-
out the paper we take an agnostic approach and impose the same degree of non-informativeness across
states. That is, we assume we do not have prior information about the driving factors of the hidden
states, i.e. aik = 0 and Aik = I · 1000, with I a p× p identity matrix.
The prior distribution for the initial state is assumed to be discrete uniform, i.e. p (Si0) = 1/K.
We complete the model by assuming that the hyper-parameters of the random-effects follow an inde-
pendent Normal-Inverse Wishart conjugate prior distribution µ ∼ N (µ0, C0), and D ∼ IW (ν0, D0)
with non-informative prior hyper-parameters, i.e. µ0 = 0, C0 = I · 1000 with I an n × n identity
matrix, and ν0 = n,D0 = I · 1000.
2.2 Posterior Sampling
We follow Chib and Winkelmann (2001), Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2006), Omori et al. (2007),
Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Fru¨hwirth (2007) and Kaufmann (2015) and propose an approximate, yet
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accurate, Gibbs sampling scheme for both the unknown parameters and the hidden states of merger
activity. This is achieved by introducing sequences of auxiliary latent variables through data augmen-
tation. Appendix A shows the convergence properties of the Gibbs sampler and provides evidence
that our model appears to be reasonably accurate when we base posterior inference on 50,000 draws
with a burn-in of 10,000 and a thinning value of 10.
Let us denote with yiτ :t = (yiτ , . . . ,yit), τ ≤ t, a collection of vectors yiu of deal flow for industry i
at time u. The set of state-dependent parameters for the ith industry is defined as θi = (θi1, . . . , θiK),
where θik =
(
βik,αik, µi
)
. At each iteration the Gibbs sampler sequentially cycles through the follow-
ing main steps:
Step 1. Draw Si1:T conditional on θi, yi1:T and zi1:T , for i = 1, . . . , n,
Step 2. Draw the parameters αi conditional on Si1:T and zi1:T , for i = 1, . . . , n,
Step 3. Draw βi conditional on yi1:T , zi1:T , and Si1:T , for i = 1, . . . , n,
Step 4. Draw the parameters µi conditional on Si1:T , β
i, yi1:T and zi1:T , for i = 1, . . . , n.
Below, we provide a detailed description of each step of the Gibbs sampler. For ease of exposition in
the notation we do not report the subscript i for each industry unless needed.
Step 1. Sampling the Latent States S1:T
The relationship between the intensity rate and the latent state of merger activity is non-linear and
non-Gaussian. In the following, we introduce two auxiliary sequences of latent processes that allow
us to eliminate both the non-linearity and the non-normality and implement a standard Bayesian
updating scheme.
For each t = 1, . . . , T the distribution of yt|λt may be regarded as the distribution of the number
of jumps of an unobserved Poisson process with intensity λt having occurred in the time period [0, 1].
The first auxiliary step of our MCMC scheme follows Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2006) and
creates such a Poisson process for yt and introduces the inter-arrival times τtj , for j = 1, . . . , (yt + 1),
as missing data. We start from the fact that, conditional on the latent states and the parameters, in a
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Poisson process, inter-arrival times are distributed as Exponential random variables, τtj ∼ Exp (λt),
τtj |θ, St = ξtj
λt
, ξtj ∼ Exp (1) (6)
This can be rewritten as a linear non-Normal model of the form
− log τtj |θ, St = z′tβSt + µi + tj , tj = − log ξtj , ξtj ∼ Exp (1) (7)
Now, let τ = (τtj , j = 1, . . . , (yt + 1) , t = 1, . . . , T ) denote the collection of all the inter-arrival times.
The full conditional distribution p (S1:T |θ, τ ,y1:T ) depends on y1:T only through τ , i.e. p (S1:T |θ, τ ,y1:T ) =
p (S1:T |θ, τ ). Given θ, S1:T and y1:T , the inter-arrival times are i.i.d;
p (τ |θ, S1:T ,y1:T ) =
T∏
t=1
p
(
τt1, . . . , τt,yt+1 |yt,θ, S1:T
)
(8)
For fixed t, the inter-arrival times τt1, . . . , τt,N+1, where N = yt are stochastically dependent, and the
joint distribution factorizes as
p (τt1, . . . , τt,N , τt,N+1|yt = N,θ, S1:T ) = p (τt,n+1|yt = N,θ, S1:T , τt1, . . . , τt,N ) p (τt1, . . . , τt,N |yt = N)
That is, the first N inter-arrival times are independent of all model parameters, and are determined
only by the observed number of counts yt. By standard properties of the Poisson process, the first N
arrival times are distributed as the order statistics of N uniform [0, 1] random variables. Therefore, if
yt > 0, the joint distribution p (τt1, . . . , τt,n|yt = N) is approximated by sampling the order statistics
ut(1), . . . , ut(N) of N = yt Uniform[0, 1] random variables, and defining the inter-arrival times as
their increments τtj = ut(j) − ut(j−1), for j = 1, . . . , N , where ut(0) = 0. Only the final inter-
arrival time τt,N+1 depends on the states S1:T and the model parameters θ through the intensity rate
λt. Conditional on yt, only yt = N arrivals occur in [0, 1], and arrival (N + 1) is known to occur
after 1. Since increments are independent, the waiting time after 1 is then distributed as Exp (λt).
Therefore, the final arrival time is sampled from p (τt,N+1|yt = N,θ, S1:T , τt1, . . . , τt,n) by defining
τt,N+1 = 1 −
∑N
j=1 τtj + ξt, where ξt ∼ Exp (λt). The linear approximation of (7) generates a non-
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Normal error term, the density of which can be approximated by a mixture of R normal components:
p () ≈
R∑
r=1
ωrN
(
;mr, σ
2
r
)
, (9)
where, for r = 1, . . . , R, mr and σ
2
r are the mean and variance of a Gaussian density. We use R = 10
deterministic components with values ωr,mr, and σ
2
r indicated in Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Wagner
(2006) and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Fru¨hwirth (2007).
Now, let R = (rtj , j = 1, . . . , (yt + 1) , t = 1, . . . , T ) denote the collection of latent component
indicators. Conditional on τ and R, the non-normal, non-linear model (1) reduces to a linear,
Gaussian model of the form
− log τtj |θ, St, rtj = z′tβSt + µi +mrtj + tj , tj |rtj ∼ N
(
0, σ2rtj
)
(10)
To sample R we exploit the fact that all indicators are independent given τ ,θ, S1:T and y1:T , i.e.,
p (R|τ ,θ, S1:T ,y1:T ) =
T∏
t=1
yt+1∏
j=1
p (rtj |τtj ,θ, St) (11)
That is, for each t = 1, . . . , T and each j = 1, . . . , yt + 1, the indicator rtj is sampled independently
from p (rtj = r|τtj ,θ, st). This density depends on the data only through τtj :
p (rtj = r|τtj ,θ, St) ∝ p (τtj |rtj = r,θ, St)ωr (12)
where
p (τtj |rtj = r,θ, St) ∝ 1
σr
exp
(
− 1
2σ2r
(− log τtj − z′tβSt − µi −mr)2) (13)
Finally, conditional on the hidden inter-arrival times τ , the mixture component indicators R, and
the parameters θ, the observation in (7) takes the form
− log τtj |θ, St, rtj = z′tβSt + µi +mrtj + tj , tj |rtj ∼ N
(
0, σ2rtj
)
(14)
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For each time t we can redefine the observation vector y˜t of dimension N = yt + 1 as
y˜t =

− log τt1 − µi −mrt1
...
− log τtN − µi −mrtN
 (15)
That is, we can rewrite an augmented model in a state-space form as
y˜t = z˜
′
tβSt + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0,Σt) , (16)
where Σt = diag
(
σ2rt1 , . . . , σ
2
rtN
)
and z˜t contains N rows of zt, i.e., z˜t = (z
′
t, . . . , z
′
t)
′.
Now we have a state-space model with a repeated measurement in which the transition equation
for the hidden states S1:T is the same as for the original Poisson regression model (1). As a matter
of fact, (16) can be treated as a Markov regime-switching seemingly unrelated regression model. As
a result, we can now implement a standard Forward Filtering Backward Sampling (FFBS) algorithm
for discrete latent states by iterating two steps: the prediction step at each time t
p (St+1 = j|θ, y˜1:t) =
K∑
k=1
pikj,tp (St = k|θ, y˜1:t) (17)
and the subsequent updating step
p(St+1 = k|θ, y˜1:t+1) = p(y˜t+1|St+1 = k,θ, z˜t)p(St+1 = k|y˜1:t,θ)
p (y˜t+1|, z˜t,θ) (18)
where p(y˜t+1|St+1 = k,θ, z˜t) = N (z˜′tβk,Σt+1), and the normalising constant is the marginal predic-
tive likelihood defined as
p (y˜t+1|z˜t,θ) =
K∑
k=1
p (y˜t+1|St+1 = k,θ, z˜t) p (St+1 = k|θ, y˜1:t) (19)
Posterior draws of the latent states can then be obtained recursively and backward in time by using
the smoothed probabilities, for example,
p (St = k|St+1 = j,y1:t,θ) = pikj,tp (St = k|y1:t,θ)
p (St+1 = j|θ,y1:t) (20)
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Step 2. Sampling the Parameters αk
The sampling of the parameters governing the time-varying transition probabilities pilk,t are drawn
based on a data augmentation process as in Kaufmann (2015). In a first step, we extend the model
to a non-normal specification for so-called state-dependent latent utilities:
Suk,t = Z
′
t−1αk + νk,t, ∀k ∈ K−k0 ,
Suk0,t = νk0,t, for the identification restriction of the reference state αk0 = 0, (21)
where Zt =
(
ztD
(1)
t , ztD
(2)
t , . . . , ztD
(K)
t , D
(1)
t , D
(2)
t , . . . , D
(K)
t
)
with D
(k)
t being a dummy variable that
takes a value equal to one if St = k. The errors νk,t are i.i.d. and follow a type I extreme value distri-
bution. Conditional on the latent state variables S1:T , we sample S
u
k,t by using a set of independent
random draws V1t, . . . , VKt from a Uniform[0, 1], such that
Suk,t = − log
(
− log (V1t)∑K
k=1 λ˜kt
− log (Vkt)
λ˜kt
I{St 6=k}
)
, (22)
with λ˜kt = exp
(
Z′t−1αk
)
. The simulation step (22) is derived by exploiting the assumption that the
maximal value of Suj,t is obtained in correspondence of the observed state. That is, exp
(
−Suj,t
)
is
the minimum value among all of the possible alternatives exp
(
−Suk,t
)
if St = j. The type I extreme
value distribution of νk,t implies that exp
(
−Suk,t
)
∼ Exp
(
λ˜kt
)
.
Given the latent utilities Sukt, we can now sample the parameters αk. However, the dynamics
implied by (21) is non-Gaussian. Just as in Step 1 above, we can approximate such distribution
by using a mixture of Normal distributions. Let Rs =
(
rst,k, k = 1, . . . ,K, t = 1, . . . , T
)
denote the
collection of latent component indicators. Given Su1:T and R
s, the non-normal, non-linear model (21)
reduces to
Suk,t = Z
′
tαk + m˜rst,k + t,k, t,k|rst,k ∼ N
(
0, σ˜2rst,k
)
To sample Rs we exploit the fact that all indicators are conditionally independent given the state-
utilities. As such, the density p (Rs|Su1:T ,α, z1:T ) depends on the observable data only through Rs:
p
(
rst,k = r|Suk,t,αk
) ∝ p (Suk,t|rst,k = r,αk, S1:T )ωsr ,
12
with
p
(
Suk,t|rst,k = r,αk, s1:T
) ∝ 1
σ˜2r
exp
(
− 1
2σ˜2r
(
Suk,t − Z′t−1αk − m˜r
)2)
, k ∈ K−k0 ,
where r = 1, . . . , 10 and the respective m˜r, σ˜
2
r and ω˜r are deterministic values taken from Fru¨hwirth-
Schnatter and Fru¨hwirth (2007). Notice that the Gaussian mixture approximations for R and Rs are
drawn separately.
Finally, for all given state-utilities Su1:T =
(
Su1,1, . . . , S
u
K,1, . . . , S
u
K,T
)
and all component indica-
tors Rs = (rs11, . . . , r
s
K1, . . . , r
s
KT ), we obtain a standard linear regression model for the parameters
governing the transition probabilities to each state, except for the reference state k0, which implies
αk0 = 0. Given the conjugate prior structure (5), the posterior distribution is updated as
(αk|y1:T , Su1:T ,Rs) ∼ NN
(
A∗k
(
T∑
t=1
Z′t−1
(
Suk,t − m˜rst,k
)
/σ˜2rst,k
+A−1k ak
)
, A∗k
)
, (23)
with A∗k =
(∑T
t=1 Zt−1Z
′
t−1/σ˜2rst,k +A
−1
k
)−1
being the posterior scale parameter.
Step 3. Sampling the Slope Parameters βk
Conditional on S1:T ,y1:T and the Gaussian linear approximation (16), the prior (4) is conjugate;
that is, we can use standard Bayesian updating rules for a multivariate Normal distribution. Let
Tk = {t : st = k} the sample conditional on the state k, the posterior for the regime-dependent betas
βk is defined as
(βk|y1:T , S1:T ) ∼ Np
B∗k
∑
t∈Tk
z˜′ty˜t +B
−1
k bk
 , B∗k
 (24)
with B∗k =
(∑
t∈Tk z˜tz˜
′
t +B
−1
k
)−1
being the posterior scale parameter. Notice that the conditional
covariance Σt is given by the latent indicators R.
Step 4. Sampling the Random-Effects
We follow Chib and Winkelmann (2001) and sample the random-effects via a Metropolis-Hastings
(MH) step with a random-walk proposal. That is, given the current value of the parameter µi, a
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sample proposal value µ∗i is generated from q (µi, µ
∗
i ) = p (µ
∗
i |µi, µ˜D) where µ˜ is a scalar that is
adjusted in trial runs to obtain suitable candidates. The acceptance rate probability is calculated as
ψ (µi, µ
∗
i ) = min (p (µ
∗
i ) q (µ
∗
i , µi) /p (µi) q (µi, µ
∗
i ) , 1) where
p (µi) = N (µi|µ, D)
T∏
t=1
exp
[− exp (z′itβSt + µi)]× [exp (z′itβSt + µi)]yit
Once a cycle of the Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler is completed for each industry, we can esti-
mate the hyper-parameters that drive the random-effects. The Normal-Inverse Wishart independent
prior in Section 2.1 is conjugate, which means that posterior draws can be sampled from the posterior
distribution
µ|D, . . . ∼ N
C∗(C−10 µ0 + n∑
i=1
D−1µi
)−1
, C∗
 with C∗ = (C−10 + nD−1)−1 ,
and D from
D|µ, . . . ∼ IW
n+ ν0,[D0 + n∑
i=1
(µi − µ) (µi − µ)′
]−1
One comment is in order. The choice of a random-walk proposal for the MH step arguably generates a
high correlation in the sample of draws from the Markov chain. To increase the effective sample size,
we keep one in ten draws and discard the draws in between. This substantially reduces the amount of
autocorrelation in the posterior sampling. Appendix A reports a set of convergence diagnostics that
show the good performance of our algorithmic procedure.
3 Data Description
The sample contains all announced bids for US private and public acquirers that were announced in the
period from 1983 to 2016, for which the bidder did not previously own a majority interest in the target
and was seeking to obtain a majority interest through the transaction. Data on M&A deal flow are
collected from Thomson One Banker and complemented with firm-level stock market and accounting
data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases, respectively.
Macroeconomic factors are collected from the Federal Reserve Economic Data series and from the
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official providers of the relevant indexes. A deal is included in the final sample if the transaction
value is above $5 million and the transaction is not a buyback, an exchange offer, a recapitalization,
an acquisition of partial or remaining interest, a spin-off, a self-tender or a repurchase. The sample
includes 65,073 observations overall, for which deal value was disclosed.
M&A deals are aggregated at the industry level for each quarter, assigning each deal to one of
twelve industries based on the four-digit SIC code of the bidder at the time of the announcement.
We use the twelve industry classification codes obtained from Kenneth French’s website. We form a
panel by matching the number of deals observed in each quarter and for each industry with a set of
variables proxying for economic shocks and market valuations.
We follow Harford (2005) and construct industry-specific economic shocks as the first principal
component of the median absolute annual changes of a set of industry-specific fundamentals variables:
margin on sales (i.e. Margin, the ratio of net income over sales), asset turnover (i.e. AT, the ratio
of sales over assets at the beginning of the period), research and development (i.e. R&D expense
scaled by assets at the beginning of the period), capital expenditures (i.e. CAPEX, scaled by assets
at the beginning of the period), growth in the number of employees (Emp), return on assets (ROA),
and sales growth (Sale). These variables are typically associated to the neoclassical hypothesis on
merger waves (see, for example, Coase, 1937, Gort, 1969, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, Harford, 1999,
Andrade et al., 2001, Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, Jovanovic and
Rousseau, 2002, and Harford, 2005). All these variables are computed by aggregating firm-level data
available on Compustat in each industry, such that we allow economic shocks to have different effects
and magnitudes across industries. In addition, other factors related to the neoclassical hypothesis
are contemporaneous capital liquidity (C&I), measured in terms of the spread between the average
interest rate on Commercial and Industrial loans, and the Fed Funds rate, as published by the Federal
Reserve.
The panel consists also of variables that capture market timing and valuations, such as the
industry-specific average book-to-market ratio (BM), its cross-sectional standard deviation (std(BM),
computed across all firms with data available on Compustat for each industry), and value-weighted
industry stock returns (Returns). These variables are often associated to the behavioural hypothesis
outlined in Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Rhodes-Kropf
et al. (2005), among others.
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We also consider a set of variables that capture aggregate macroeconomic conditions (see, for
example, Melicher et al., 1983, Shugart and Tollison, 1984, Becketti, 1986, Town, 1992, Golbe and
White, 1993, Mulherin and Boone, 2000, Andrade et al., 2001, and Choi and Jeon, 2011). These
include: year-on-year monthly compounded industrial production growth as a measure of changes
in aggregate output, the credit spread (measured as the yield spread between Moody’s 20-year Baa-
and Aaa-rated corporate bonds), and the real risk-free rate (proxied by the difference between the
one-month T-bill rate and the CPI log inflation rate). Table 1 provides a detailed description of
sources and frequencies of the determinants investigated in the empirical analysis.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Merger deals are clustered at quarterly frequency as a trade-off between having enough granularity in
the data and keeping enough information; namely, this means there are a sufficient number of deals
for each data point and for each industry. In order to ensure a coherent comparison across sets of
predictors, we collected the data on both financial variables and economic shocks at the quarterly
frequency, as well.
Shocks to an industry environment can also come from major regulatory changes. We define
a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the industry has recently been subject to one of the
deregulatory events.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 documents major deregulatory initiatives during the sample period 1983:Q1-2016:Q4. Dereg-
ulatory events are considered at the industry level, assigning each event to one of twelve industries
based on the SIC code of the bidder at the time of the announcement. The events are constructed
from Viscusi et al. (2005) and by searching for recent major initiatives in Factiva.
4 Empirical Results
Following Harford (2005), we call the first principal component from the seven economic shock vari-
ables (Margin, AT, R&D, CAPEX, Emp, Roa, and Sales) the Economic Activity index. This index
is included in the regression together with the regressors justified by the behavioral theory, a dummy
for regulatory changes, the proxy for capital liquidity and the set of macro-financial factors, which
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makes zt composed of nine explanatory variables.
For the ease of exposition, we report the time series of deals for four representative industries,
namely Manufacturing, Telecommunications, Money and Healthcare. Although this choice looks
restrictive, it turns out that these four sectors are fairly representative of overall market activity.
Figure 1 shows the unconditional distribution of the deal flow across industries, calculated on the
basis of the average number of deals over the sample period for a given industry relative to the
average number of deals at the aggregate market level.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The figure makes clear that Money represents the biggest market where M&A is implemented and
that, together with Manufacturing, Telecommunications and Healthcare, it represents almost half of
the total market activity. Figure 2 shows the time series of market transaction data (light blue bars).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The dynamics of deal flow is not synchronous across industries but varies in the cross-section. For
instance, while the deal flow for Money yMoney,t (bottom-left panel) peaks in the second half of the 90s
and from 2005 to 2010, the intensity of M&A activity for the Telecommunications sector is sensibly
increasing from the late 80s, while it is substantially flat from the beginning of the 2000s. Also,
different industries show different persistence in periods of high merger activity. For instance, the
deal flow is remarkably high for almost ten years for the Telecommunications industry, while it lasts
a few years for Manufacturing and Other. Notably, across all industries, the major M&A activity is
concentrated between the late 90s and the first half of the 2000s.
We first test the significance of determinants of merger waves for each industry separately. In
the modeling framework, we explicitly consider industry-specific random-effects, which are drawn
from a common cross-sectional distribution. We assume throughout that two regimes are enough to
characterize the dynamics of merger waves in the time series of deal flow. In Section 4.2, we formally
assess out-of-sample the assumption of two regimes by calculating the log-predictive density ratios
of a model with three regimes and a model with two regimes. The results show that a two-state
specification compares favorably to the three-state alternative specification.
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4.1 The Dynamics of Merger Waves
In terms of the two states, we label St = 1 as “no-wave” and St = 2 as “wave”, respectively. In our
modeling setting, the significance of a specific factor to determine a change to a state of merger wave
can be directly tested on the basis of posterior estimates of αz12 =
(
αz12,1, . . . ,α
z
12,N
)
. For instance, a
positive and significant αz12,1 implies that the first factor can explain a regime switch towards a merger
wave. On the other hand, if αz12,1 is not statistically different from zero, it means that the first factor
does not significantly affect regimes of merger activity. Figure 3 shows the posterior distributions
of αz12 across four representative industries, namely Manufacturing, Telecommunications, Money and
Healthcare. Posterior estimates are obtained from the Gibbs sampler detailed in Section 2. For ease
of exposition, we do not report the posterior estimates of those parameters that are not statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level, i.e. those where the zero value enters the 95% posterior
credibility interval.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The cross-sectional standard deviation of the book-to-market ratio significantly and negatively affects
the dynamics of merger waves, with the exception of the financial sector. This is consistent with the
evidence provided by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005), which showed that the increasing volatility of valuation ratios can have a negative
effect on merger activity, meaning that when market volatility increases the aggregate propensity to
engage in M&A decreases. Similarly, the level of the book-to-market ratio represents a significant
predictor of aggregate M&A activity for the financial sector and the Telecommunications industry.
Again, this is consistent with the existing evidence and the behavioral hypothesis, which posits that
merger waves tend to occur when market prices are higher than fundamentals, i.e. market timing.
This explains the negative relationship between the book-to-market ratios and merger waves. On the
other hand, past returns do not seem to be significantly related to the one-step ahead probability of
being in a state of merger wave.
The impact of economic activity on the dynamics of merger waves is null except for in the Money
sector. Overall, shocks to industry-specific economic conditions do not represent significant driving
factors of transitions towards periods of abnormally high merger activity. As a result, the empirical
evidence does not support the neoclassical theory on merger waves for most industries. Interestingly,
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and partly consistent with the results of Harford (2005), capital liquidity negatively affects merger
waves for the Money industry. As liquidity conditions gets tighter, the propensity to engage in merging
deals in the financial sector decreases.
One comment is in order. We do not argue that capital liquidity per se does not have a direct
effect on merger activity. Indeed, non-financial firms could be heavily affected by the access to credit
markets. Instead, we assess that the explanatory power of liquidity conditions can be mitigated once
including the aggregate business cycle in the regression specification. Indeed, aggregate economic
and credit conditions are closely related. This intuition is captured by the coefficient on industrial
production for the non-financial industries, whose interpretation should be opposite to the one on
capital liquidity, as proxied by the C&I loan spread. Output growth positively and significantly affects
the majority of industries, i.e. αz12 6= 0. Regulatory changes turn out to increase the propensity of
engaging in M&A for Telecommumications. This is consistent with the results provided in Harford
(2005).
The posterior estimates of the sensitivity parameters in Figure 3 suggest that macroeconomic
fundamentals play a significant role in the dynamics of merger waves, supporting a more general
“merger activity-economic prosperity” theory to complement the behavioral explanation (see, for
example, Reid, 1968, Melicher et al., 1983, Shugart and Tollison, 1984, Becketti, 1986, Town, 1992,
Golbe and White, 1993, Mulherin and Boone, 2000, Andrade et al., 2001, and Choi and Jeon, 2011
for related discussions). As a matter of fact, the slope on industrial production turns out to be a
significant driving force for the state of merger wave. Interestingly, the effect of economic growth is
opposite for financial vs non-financial firms, with output growth that is negatively related to M&A
activity for the latter. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that posits that consolidation
and re-structuring in the financial sector is often countercyclical. As far as the non-financial sectors
are concerned, higher output growth leads to an increased probability of being in a merger wave. In
other words, for non-financial sectors, merger waves tend to be positively correlated with the business
cycle.
The ability to capture the heterogeneity in the significance of merger wave determinants is a key
feature of our model. In fact, by aggregating deals at the market level, one would likely average
out the longitudinal variation. Figure 4 shows this case in point. The left panel shows the posterior
estimates of the industry-specific random-effects for representative sectors, namely Manufacturing,
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Telecommunications, Healthcare, and Money.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The estimates make clear that there is indeed a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the industry
fixed-effect, meaning that there are non-trivial effects across industries that are not directly captured
by our set of explanatory variables. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the posterior estimates of the
cross-sectional covariance matrix D in Step 4 of the Gibbs sampler outlined in Section 2. Although
random effects are highly significant, the low cross-sectional correlations show that they share only a
mild common structure. This suggests that, conditional on the set of predictive variables, the residual
co-movement across merger waves is low.
The low cross-sectional correlations for the industry random-effects suggest that the model-implied
posterior estimates of the probabilities of being in a state of high merger activity can be quite different
across industries. Figure 5 shows that this is indeed the case. The posterior, i.e. smoothed, merger
wave probability changes quite substantially in the cross-section.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
While for the Manufacturing industry (top-left panel) abnormally high M&A activity is mostly clus-
tered in a few years towards the end of the 90s, the posterior estimates for merger waves for Telecom-
munications (top-right panel), for example, tend to be more spread throughout the sample. More
generally, consistent with the results in Harford (2005), most of the wave periods are located across
the second half of the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s.
However, two important unexplored features emerge. First, coherent with the time series be-
haviour of deal flow, the length of model-implied merger waves is not homogeneous across industries,
as for some industries, such as Manufacturing, for example, the length of abnormally high merger
activity can be much more than for Telecommunications, Healthcare and Money. Such heterogeneity
in persistence would be ignored by pooling together information on deal flow and investigating the
determinants of merger waves at the aggregate level. Second, waves, although overlapping to some
extent, are not contemporaneous across industries. For instance, while the merger wave for Telecom-
munications mostly coincided with the economic prosperity of the mid- to late-80s and the second
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half of the 90s, the same explanation would not apply for the Healthcare and the Money industries.
Differently, the merger waves in these industries would be consistent with the recovery after the eco-
nomic recession of 1990–91, as confirmed by a positive effect of output growth on the propensity to
engage in a deal.
Such heterogeneity is primarily due to the differences in the persistence of the transition proba-
bilities. Figure 6 shows the posterior estimates of αz22, which are the parameters that determine the
persistence of a state of high merger activity.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
For the sake of comparison with Figure 3, we report the posterior estimates of the slope parameters
for the same explanatory variables. Two results emerge. First, it is evident that the factors driving
the persistence of the merger wave state are not the same across industries. For instance, while the
persistence of the latent state for Manufacturing is significantly affected by valuations uncertainty,
the same is not true for the Money sector, where the cross-sectional standard deviation of the book-
to-market ratio does not play any significant role. Second, some of the factors that contribute in
accelerating merger activity do not affect the persistence of merger waves. For instance, while the
top-left panel of Figure 3 shows that C&I is highly significant for the dynamics of αz12, the same
variable does not have a significant effect on the persistence of St = 2. Similarly, both C&I and the
book-to-market ratio turn out to be insignificant for the persistence of merger waves (see bottom-left
panel). To summarize, Figures 5 provide evidence that, despite some overlapping, merger waves are
not synchronous across industries over time. More precisely, Figure6 shows that such diversity is
primarily due to the heterogeneity in the significant factors that drive the time-varying transition
probabilities.
5 Model Assessment
Figures 3 to 5 together support the idea that determinants of merger waves are heterogeneous in nature
and specific for different industries. These empirical results ground on the idea that two regimes are
enough to characterize the dynamics of merger waves in the time series of deal flow. Figure 7 gives
a visual impression of the model in-sample performance. The solid red line represents the posterior
21
median of λSt,t as specified in (1), which represents an estimate of the expected number of deals. The
fit of the model is quite accurate.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Except for the initial part of the merger wave in the Healthcare industry, posterior estimates of the
expected number of deals closely follow peaks in merger activity. The model fits reasonably well the
deal flow for Money (bottom-left panel), Manufacturing (top-left panel), and Telecommunications
(top-right panel). As a whole, Figure 7 suggests that a non-linear, non-Gaussian model specification
with two regimes is likely coherent with the time-series of deal flows.
We now compute and compare the benchmark two-state regime-switching specification against
both a three-state and a one-state alternative by comparing the density forecasts; and we then evaluate
the log predictive density ratios (LPDR), at horizon k and across time indices t, that is,
LPDRit(k) =
t∑
τ=1
log{p(yiτ+k|yi1:τ ,Ms)/p(yiτ+k|yi1:τ ,M0)}, for i = 1, . . . , n, (25)
where p(yiτ+k|yi1τ ,Ms) is the marginal predictive density computed at time τ for the horizon τ + k
under the competing specification indexed by Ms, compared to our forecasting framework labeled
by M0. Marginal predictive densities allow us to make a robust comparison across models as they
take into account the latent nature of state indicators for merger waves and the uncertain nature of
the model parameters. In that respect, by calculating the marginal predictive density we provide a
measure of the ability of the model to explain not only the expected value, i.e. the intensity, of merger
deals, but also their overall distribution, naturally penalizing the size/complexity of different models.
The marginal likelihood for each model is not available in closed form and must be approximated
numerically.
We approximate the predictive density by using an importance sampling (IS) estimator (see,
for example, Geweke, 2005, and Geweke and Amisano, 2012), in which sampling draws from the
posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained using the entire sample of observable predictors
and latent expected returns. The IS estimator is expected to work well in practice when the Gibbs
sampler covers reasonably well the parameter region where the conditional likelihood is large. This
is usually the case for low dimensional models like ours. In addition, conditional on using the same
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set of parameters across forecasting horizons, the importance-sampling estimator is unbiased and the
predictive likelihood can be consistently estimated from the posterior (see, for example, Geweke, 2005).
We simulate in each Gibbs step yiτ+h|yi1:τ using (1) and the Markov regime-switching dynamics,
where we replace the parameters and the in-sample latent variables by the draw from the posterior
distribution.
As used by several authors recently, LPDR measures provide a direct statistical assessment of
relative accuracy and can be interpreted as a log predictive Bayes factor under the assumption of
equal prior models’ probabilities. In this respect, the LPDR weighs and compares dispersion of
forecast densities along with location, giving a broader understanding of the predictive abilities of the
different regime assumptions.
We obtain the one-quarter ahead predictions through direct forecasting, as indirect procedures
would entail iterating forward the posterior predictive distribution multiple times, including pre-
dicting the determinants, and thus repeatedly rerunning the MCMC sampler. Also, the Markov
regime-switching dynamics of the model imply that direct and indirect forecasting are approximately
numerically equivalent. The forecast at time t is based on a re-estimation of the model using an ex-
panding window of merger activity determinants. We start from an initial training sample of τ0 = 60,
and produce a one-step ahead forecast τ0 +1, which is then evaluated against the observable deal flow
at time τ0 + 1. We then repeat this process until the end of the sample and compute the predictive
densities to measure (25).
We compute the predictive densities both separately for each industry and jointly for the overall
economy. Figures 4 and 5 show that there is a mild but significant correlation for the merger waves
across industries. In this respect, the joint predictive density provides additional information about
the out-performance of the two-state model vs alternatives. In order to keep the graphs readable, we
rescaled the LPDR by its sample deviation. The top panels of Figure 8 show the results comparing
the three-state vs the two-state specification.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
The top-left panel shows that the out-of-sample performance is strongly in favour of the two-state
regime switching specification across industries (see Kass and Raftery, 1995 for a discussion of thresh-
old values related to the log predictive Bayes factor). Except for the Telecommunicaitons industry
23
in the early 2000s, the out-performance of the Poisson regression with two vs three regimes steadily
increases over time, especially for those sectors more correlated with the business cycle, such as Man-
ufacturing, Consumer Durables, Business Equipment and Consumer Non-Durables. The top-right
right panel shows the joint LPDR; again, the two-state specification fits the data better.
The bottom panels of Figure 8 show the results comparing the one-state vs the two-state specifica-
tion. With the only exception being Manufacturing in the late 90s, a model with two regimes vs state
invariant generates a much larger marginal predictive density. Similarly, the right panel shows that
the outperformance of the two-state specification is not limited to a few industries, but is confirmed
by the joint marginal predictive density. As a whole, the empirical evidence provided by Figure 8
strongly points towards a model with two regimes vs both a three- and a one-state alternative.
6 Conclusion
We propose a novel Markov regime-switching Poisson regression model with time-varying transition
probabilities to rationalize wave-like patterns in the intensity rate of industry-specific merger activity.
Empirically, we show that merger waves vary significantly across industries, both in terms of their
timing and persistence. Such differences are mainly due to a significant heterogeneity in the factor
exposures. That is, the cross-sectional differences in the dynamics of merger waves can be explained
by differences in the transition dynamics that drive the states of merger waves, even after accounting
for cross-sectional random-effects. This suggests that any inference on existing economically justified
competing explanations of merger waves would suffer from generalization at the aggregate market
level, as the observed cross-industry heterogeneity in waves is shown to be the consequence of different
responses to common or distinct drivers of merger activity.
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Appendix
A Convergence Diagnostics
To further to understand the properties of our modelling framework, we investigate the convergence
properties of the MCMC algorithm outlined in Section 2. The results below are based on 50,000
posterior draws with a burn-in of 10,000 and a thinning value of 10. If the algorithm is designed
properly, we should expect that the Markov chain of the posterior draws of the parameters will
convergence to some stable distribution (see, e.g., Gelman and Rubin, 1992, Geweke, 1992, Raftery
and Lewis, 1992, and Brooks and Gelman, 1998 for details).
One way to see if our Markov chain is mixing is to see how fast it convergences to the same stable
mean. Th left panel of Figure A.1 shows the running mean plot. A running mean plot is a plot of the
iterations against the mean of the draws up to each iteration. More precisely, Figure A.1 reports the
running mean for the betas averaged across predictors for the Consumer Durable industry. Results
for other industries are qualitatively the same. The benchmark specification is with K = 2 and with
all predictors included.
[Insert Figure A.1 about here]
A good mixing chain is assumed to converge quickly to some long-run mean value. This is indeed
the case for both the chain conditional on a state of high merger activity (red line) and low merger
activity (blue line). The running mean quickly converges for both chains and remains highly stable
after the burn-in sample (vertical black line).
Another graphical way to assess convergence is to assess the autocorrelations between the draws
of the Markov chain. If autocorrelation is still relatively high for higher lags, this indicates a high
correlation between draws and slow mixing. That is, the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the
effective sample size used to approximate the posterior quantities of interest.
The right panel of Figure A.1 shows the autocorrelation function (ACF) for the average betas
across predictors for the Consumer Durable industry. The benchmark specification is with two regimes
and all regressors. The ACF is low from the very initial lags for the chain conditional on both merger
wave (blue line) and no merger wave (red line). The low autocorrelation is due to the fact that we
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keep one in ten draws and discard the others. This significantly reduces the persistence of the draws.
Albeit informative, the evidence provided in Figure A.1 is not conclusive. We now test the Markov
chain convergence by implementing a test of difference of means to investigate if draws are from the
same distribution (see Geweke, 1992). The test statistic is a standard Z-score with standard errors
computed using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance
estimator with a bandwidth set to 4%, 8%, and 15% of the utilized sample size. Table A.1 shows
the results for the average betas for the explanatory variables in the merger waves dynamics across
different industries.
[Insert Table A.1 about here]
Column one of the summary of convergence diagnostics shows that even without correcting for auto-
correlation the t-statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of equal means in the sub-samples for
seven out of twelve industries, and only for Energy, Telecomm and Utilities the null hypothesis is
rejected at the 99% confidence level. The evidence of convergence significantly increases by adjusting
the standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. While for a bandwidth of 4% of the
data only Telecomm, Utilities and Energy reject the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence level, the
Z-score calculated using a bandwidth of 15% shows strong evidence of convergence with none of the
industries rejecting the null hypothesis.
To summarize, Figure A.1 and Table A.1 provide evidence that our model appears to be reasonably
accurate when we base posterior inference on 50,000 draws with a burn-in of 10,000 and a thinning
value of 10, which keeps the computational burden relatively low.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Deals
This figure shows the unconditional distribution of deals, calculated as the sample average of the deals flow relative
to the aggregate number of deals across the sample. Deals are measured as the number of all M&A bids announced
by US private and public acquirers for US public and private targets. We considered those deals with a value higher
than $5mln (including net debt of the target), and exclude those identified as spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders,
exchange offers and repurchases. Industry classification is based on the four-digit SIC codes according to the twelve-
industry classification provided by Kenneth French. The sample period is 1983:Q1-2016:Q4.
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Figure 2: Time Series of Industry Merger Activity
This figure reports the time series of merger activity across industries, measured as the number of all M&A bids
announced by US private and public acquirers for US public and private targets in the period 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4. The
left axis on each graph represents the number of deals.
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Figure 3: Explanatory Variables and Merger Waves
This figure shows the effect of explanatory variables on the posterior probability of a merger wave as identified by the
vector of coefficients αz12. Industry classification is based on the four-digit SIC codes according to the twelve-industry
classification provided by Kenneth French. The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4, quarterly.
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Figure 4: Random Effects Estimates
This figure shows the posterior estimates of the industry-specific random effects for representative sectors, namely
Manufacturing, Telecommunications, Healthcare and Money (left panel), and the posterior estimates of the cross-
sectional covariance matrix D. The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4.
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Figure 5: Posterior Probabilities of Industry Merger Waves
This figure shows the model-implied probability of being in a state of high merger activity. Industry classification
is based on the four-digit SIC codes according to the twelve-industry classification provided by Kenneth French. The
shaded gray areas show the posterior probabilities and the blue lines show the rescaled number of deals for each industry.
The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4.
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Figure 6: Explanatory Variables and the Persistence of Merger Waves
This figure shows the effect of explanatory variables on the persistence of merger waves as identified by the vector of
coefficients αz22. Industry classification is based on the four-digit SIC codes according to the twelve-industry classification
provided by Kenneth French. The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4, quarterly.
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Figure 7: Merger Activity and Model-Implied Intensity Rates
This figure shows the actual number of M&A deals and the median model-implied intensity rates computed assuming
there are two distinct regimes identifying merger waves, i.e. K = 2. Deals are measured as the number of all M&A
bids announced by US private and public acquirers for US public and private targets in the period 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4,
quarterly. The solid red line is the merger intensity rate implied by the model.
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Figure 8: Log Predictive Density Ratio
This figure shows the recursive Log Predictive Density Ratio (LPDR) comparing a model with three regimes against a
model with two regimes (top panels), and comparing a model with one regime against a model with two regimes (bottom
panels). The left panels show the results for all industries separately and the right panels show the results for the joint
predictive density. The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4.
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Figure A.1: Convergence Diagnostics
This figure shows some convergence diagnostics for our MCMC estimation scheme. The benchmark specification is with
K = 2 regimes and the whole set of predictors outlined in Section 3. The left panel shows the recursive mean for the
average betas, conditional on both a state of high merger wave (red line) and a state of no-wave (blue line). The running
mean is computed by computing the mean for an enlarging window of the MCMC draws of the betas averaged across
factors. The right panel shows the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the average betas draws, conditional on both the
“no-wave” state (red line) and the “wave” state (blue line). The sample period is 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4.
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Table 2: Deregulatory Events
This table reports major deregulatory initiatives during the sample period 1983:01 to 2016:12. Deregulatory events are
considered at the industry level, assigning each event to one of twelve industries based on the SIC code of the bidder
at the time of the announcement and according to the twelve-industry classification provided by Kenneth French. The
events are constructed from Viscusi et al. (2005) and searching for recent major initiatives in Factiva.
Year Event Industry
1984 Cable Television Deregulation Act Other
Shipping Act Other
1987 Elimination of Fairness Doctrine (FCC) Other
Sale of Conrail Other
1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act Energy
1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act Money
1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act Other
Energy Policy Act Energy
FERC Order 636 Utils
1993 Elimination of State regulation of cellular telephone rates Telecomm
Negotiated Rates Act Other
1994 Trucking Industry and Regulatory Reform Act Other
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act Money
1995 Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act Telecomm
1996 Telecommunications Act Telecomm
FERC Order 888 Utils
1999 FERC Order 2000 Utils
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act Money
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Table A.1: Convergence Diagnostics
This table summarizes the convergence results for the posterior values of the model parameters, estimated over
the sample period 1983:Q1 to 2016:Q4. In order to assess inefficiencies, we used the benchmark specification
with K = 2 regimes and the complete set of explanatory variables outlined in the main text. For each set of
parameters, we compute the p-value of the Geweke (1992) t-test for the null hypothesis of equality of the means
computed for the first 20% and the last 50% of the retained MCMC draws after burn-in. The variances of the
means are estimated with the Newey and West (1987) estimator using a bandwidth of 4%, 8%, and 15% of the
sample sizes, respectively.
Summary of Convergence Diagnostics
Industry i.i.d Bandwidth of 4% Bandwidth of 8% Bandwidth of 15%
Cons. Non-Durb. 0.042 0.349 0.437 0.486
Cons. Durb. 0.893 0.898 0.899 0.905
Manufacturing 0.656 0.866 0.898 0.919
Energy 0.000 0.043 0.114 0.189
Chems 0.249 0.371 0.367 0.342
Business Equip. 0.020 0.056 0.088 0.160
Telecomm 0.000 0.011 0.071 0.124
Utils 0.000 0.031 0.052 0.134
Shops 0.231 0.394 0.474 0.514
Healthcare 0.173 0.416 0.492 0.541
Money 0.132 0.637 0.640 0.641
Other 0.201 0.340 0.550 0.701
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